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> upshot • Gash describes some very in-
teresting and exemplary work using RC-
influenced research and practices. I wor-
ry that his third stage of a three-stage 
emergence of constructivist epistemolo-
gy in the study of cognitive development 
is consistent with a distinction between 
focus on individual cognitive develop-
ment and focus on knowledge not in the 
mind but in the group, inconsistent with 
RC. An alternative is given and the issue 
of an RC perspective on social justice is 
discussed.
« 1 » in his target article “Constructing 
Constructivism,” Hugo Gash provides us 
with an important perspective on the influ-
ence of rC on research and practice in edu-
cation. in §4 he suggests we might think in 
terms “of stages in the emergence of the con-
structivist epistemology.” This is one possi-
ble view, but i would like to suggest that the 
apparent distinction between the individual 
and the social, as it is typically made, is not 
consistent with rC.
« 2 » in §29 Gash uses the phrase: “so-
cial construction of knowledge.” normally, 
in educational literature, it is used with a vy-
gotskian perspective. But Lev vygotski was 
not rC and neither are his advocates now. 
(dykstra 2009: 194–199) Yet in §10 Gash 
suggests:
“ When a researcher emphasises the individual 
construction, the social side remains a part of the 
context; and alternatively, when the social context 
is emphasised, the individual interpretation plays 
a critical role.”
His §10 sounds more consistent with rC 
than his §29, but in §10 there is still the 
“social context” as distinguished from “indi-
vidual construction” or “individual interpre-
tation,” as if the “social context” is a kind of 
given for all while the individual construc-
tions are personal. This is an example of 
how this language is not consistent with rC. 
Each of us has to construct our understand-
ings of social contexts, just as we have to do 
so about why an object appears to move.
« 3 » in §§12–21 we find descriptions 
of research on students’ conceptions of oth-
ers and the notion that students can change 
their conceptions of others. This is much 
more like rC. in this respect, Gash’s target 
article seems to pull the reader back and 
forth between a view that is rC and one 
that is not. it is not easy to free oneself from 
language that is not rC. This may be part of 
what is going on in Gash, but we are writing 
in a venue for trying to clarify our rC think-
ing for ourselves and others.
« 4 » Jean Piaget was firmly against the 
notion that development was constituted 
of an accumulation of learnings. instead, 
he maintained that each learning is a func-
tion of the current development of the indi-
vidual (Piaget 1964: 171). in the Proceedings 
of the First Annual Symposium of the Jean 
Piaget Society, Piaget talks about the factors 
that influence development (Piaget 1972). 
to summarize, he indicates three classi-
cal factors that play a role in development: 
maturation, experience, and social interac-
tion. However, he maintains that these three 
alone cannot explain development without 
a fourth factor, equilibration. Equilibration 
explains the changes that constitute psycho-
logical and cognitive development. There is 
a coordination between the first three fac-
tors that is a kind of dynamic equilibrium. 
in addition, in the construction of new cog-
nitive operations, there is an iterative trial-
and-error process, which uses the results of 
the previous trial to inform the generation 
of a new trial (Piaget 1972: 14). The results 
of a trial are anticipated on the basis of exist-
ing cognitive operations and models of the 
world. When the results are not what was 
anticipated, the trial has resulted in an er-
ror, which gives rise to speculative changes 
in the cognitive operations and/or models 
for a new trial. The search for a resolution 
to the disequilibration ultimately results in a 
new equilibrium, cognitive operations, and/
or models of the world for which trials do 
not result in errors, at least for a while.
« 5 » in his discussion of the experien-
tial factor in development, Piaget suggests 
there are two kinds of experience (Piaget 
1972: 7). one is the effect on our nervous 
systems by objects, and events involving ob-
jects, in the physical world. The other kind 
of experience is our manipulations of ob-
jects, in effect experiences of objects in the 
mind. a simple example is having a number 
of objects and choosing to line them up and 
count them. one might then decide to count 
them in the other direction. Lining the ob-
jects up, counting them, and then counting 
them in the opposite direction are not prop-
erties of the objects themselves. to line them 
up and count them are mental inventions, 
hence, experiences with objects of the mind.
« 6 » Human beings are cognizing enti-
ties in a person’s world. They are much more 
complex and much less passive than most 
physical objects in our constructed reali-
ties. However, just as with physical objects, 
we each must construct mental models 
of those around and important to us. one 
can argue that in the experiments Gash de-
scribes, students are engaged in construct-
ing more effective models of other human 
beings. at one level this is no different than 
constructing a more effective mental model 
of a bicycle. However, with a bicycle, if one 
subjects it to a certain set of conditions, it 
will always behave a certain way, as will all 
bicycles made to be the same. not so with 
human beings. They are so complex and 
subtle, it is virtually impossible to establish 
the same conditions twice.
« 7 » Luckily, we can discern patterns 
in the behaviors of human beings. These 
patterns are our first foothold into mak-
ing mental constructs to associate with 
other human beings. Culture has a power-
ful effect on the behavior of human beings, 
giving more footholds on making mental 
constructs to associate with those around 
us. Culture provides us with one more tool, 
language. Language gives us a very power-
ful tool for both giving and receiving feed-
back as we experience others. Language, and 
therefore culture, also has effects on how we 
think as we are mentally constructing our 
models of the world around us.
« 8 » The stances of both Piaget and 
Glasersfeld with respect to our fellow hu-
man beings are to treat all as epistemic enti-
ties. We acknowledge that each of us bears 
the responsibility to make the most effective 
constructions of our worlds, but that these 
constructions will not necessarily all be the 
same as our own. We know that, apparently, 
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some have started more recently than us 
and others seem to have stopped their con-
structions of their worlds.7 in both cases, 
language is the tool for interaction, engag-
ing others in continuing in or getting back 
to the construction process. This respect for 
others as epistemic beings is a fundamental 
element of social justice as the practice of 
and an outcome of rC.
« 9 » it can be argued that we have three 
kinds of experience: physical, mental, and 
social.8 We could argue that there is some 
kind of hierarchy composed of these three 
kinds of experience, temporal or of com-
7 | By “stopped their constructions of their 
worlds,” i am referring to the second of two basic 
options one has in the presence of a disequilibra-
tion. This option is to choose to avoid resolving 
the disequilibration. it is as if one is walking away 
from it and hoping it will not arise again. i be-
lieve that one can choose to live a life in which 
only minor refinements or adjustments to one’s 
mental models are called for. This involves care-
fully choosing what inputs to immerse oneself 
in. i have certainly seen students who seem to 
be operating in this way. Because not all instruc-
tors are there just to present information, as these 
students believe school is all about, these students 
justify the low grades they earn by the claim that 
the instructor did not do a proper job. This, i ad-
mit, is a kind of resolution to the uncomfortable 
situation of a bad grade, but there is no change in 
understanding on their part about what school is 
about, nor is there any change in understanding 
about any phenomena that were the subject of the 
course. Could these students change? of course, 
but it is clear that the process will take more than 
one semester’s worth of exposure to this alterna-
tive to just being lectured at in college.
8 | at the deepest level there is only experi-
ence. signals into the brain from the eyes are in-
distinguishable from signals coming to the brain 
from the ears or other sensory organs. since, for 
example, the quality “red” is not apparent in these 
signals, red is apparently produced in the brain 
instead of coming into the brain from the “outside 
world” through the eyes. We are left with the con-
clusion that everything we construct as our world, 
we construct in response to these indistinguish-
able signals. Each of us organizes all these things 
our brains generate; thus it is we, the observers 
of these experiences, who decide to categorize 
experiences into types such as physical, mental, 
and social. Thus, these types of experience are our 
constructions and are not ontological.
plexity, but such arguments are probably 
neither productive nor solvable. it is appar-
ent that school and culture should engage 
students in constructing ever more effec-
tive reasoning patterns and models of how 
the world (including other human beings) 
works. But, is this what is happening?
« 10 » unfortunately, we have known 
that schooling is not engaging students in 
constructing more powerful reasoning pat-
terns and constructions of the world since 
at least the 1970s. When the work of Piaget 
and his colleagues was introduced into sci-
ence education in the us, people started try-
ing to assess the stages in the development 
of reasoning in their students. Early on this 
was done using interviews modelled after 
those of Piaget and using paper-and-pencil 
puzzles, which grew out of the kinds of tasks 
Piaget’s group were using. in the mid-1970s 
it appeared that about 1/3 of people were 
still displaying reasoning at the level of con-
crete operations, about 1/3 were displaying 
reasoning at the level of formal operations, 
and the remaining 1/3 were sometimes 
displaying concrete operations when for-
mal operations were appropriate and other 
times displaying formal operations. it also 
was documented that these proportions did 
not appear to change in in any significant 
way from the ages of about 13 to 45 (arons 
& Karplus 1976: 396). Clearly, schooling 
through college and culture were not result-
ing in further increases in the proportion 
displaying formal operations. Yet it is pos-
sible for human beings to have developed 
formal operations by the age of 18. There is 
no evidence that this situation is different 
today.
« 11 » at the same time, physicists read-
ing the work of Paget and his group noticed 
in the interview transcripts that not only 
could one see evidence of the reasoning the 
subjects were doing, but one could also see 
evidence of how the subjects thought the 
phenomenon in the interview task worked. 
This gave rise to a large quantity of work 
investigating students’ conceptions of the 
phenomena studied in physics and other 
science classes. two important findings of 
this work are:
1 | students come to class with strongly 
held conceptions of the phenomena that 
do not match what their instructors are 
telling them.
2 | standard instruction results in no real 
change in the students’ conceptions of 
the phenomena.
schooling appears to have no effect on either 
development of reasoning or on students’ 
understanding of the phenomena.
« 12 » one can ask why this is the case, if 
these results are widely available? of course, 
if teachers are trained in the conventional 
methods, they teach as they were taught and 
trained to teach. one way to explain the situ-
ation is that standard instruction is couched 
in a paradigm that promotes neither devel-
opment of reasoning nor conceptual devel-
opment. Paradigms define what is appropri-
ate, what questions can be asked, and what 
questions are not asked. in the following, 
this standard instructional paradigm and an 
rC alternative will be described.
paradigm one: prevalent in most 
standard instruction
« 13 » schooling in this paradigm is 
about transmitting knowledge considered 
important by the culture to young mem-
bers of the culture. While it is not explicitly 
taught, one of the lessons most thoroughly 
absorbed is a view of categories of students 
in school, a kind of caste system, which is 
then translated to their views of the world 
outside of school.
« 14 » teaching under this paradigm be-
comes the presentation of the official canons 
of the culture by approved methods. stu-
dents are tested on how well they can give 
back the knowledge presented and skills at 
which they have drilled and practiced. stu-
dents who do not do well in such tests are as-
sumed not to be members of the upper caste 
in school. The descriptions of the character-
istics of the castes of students are in terms of 
mental ability or “gifts,” thus not under the 
control of the teachers. students who do not 
do well are at the mercy of their own genes 
and upbringing, both of which are out of the 
teachers’ hands. in essence, the victims of 
the paradigm one pedagogy are blamed for 
their failures. When the teacher has present-
ed the official knowledge by an approved 
method, then the teacher’s responsibility has 
been successfully discharged.
« 15 » a more complete description of 
teaching in this paradigm is “the presenta-
tion of the established canon by approved 
methods for the benefit of the deserving” 
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(dykstra 2005: 54). The students who have 
the requisite mental capacities and diligence 
of work characteristics count among the 
deserving because they can appropriately 
repeat back what the teacher has presented. 
This deserving group is considered elite and 
superior. The rest are the lower caste, the un-
deserving.
« 16 » This folk theory of teaching de-
scribed in the previous paragraph is unchal-
lenged. it has little to do with cognitive and 
intellectual development. in fact, it appears 
to retard such development and promote the 
caste system. These “lower caste” students 
are subjected to a social injustice that is un-
fortunately pervasive in our culture.
paradigm two: consistent with Rc 
and socially just
« 17 » in the second paradigm, all hu-
man beings are understood to construct for 
themselves working models of the world 
around them. These models enable them to 
function in the world. These models con-
stitute their understanding of their world. 
Because these models are constructed in 
their minds, the conceptual entities of which 
the models are constructed are only in the 
realm of the mental.9 since in this paradigm 
9 | There is often a discussion on this issue 
about the existence of the conceptual entities in 
the “real” world. The argument goes: if we can-
not know the “truth” of our theories, then is it not 
possible that a theory could be “true” even though 
we do not know it? The question is couched in 
the realist point of view. in rC, we know that we 
make up our theories to fit our experience. When 
they are found to fit experience and predict the 
outcome of future tests, the best we can say is that 
a theory fits experience and has predicted future 
tests accurately. We cannot say such theories are 
closer to some truth or “mind independent real-
ity.” it is a trivial constructivism to believe that 
our constructed explanations describe or might 
describe what is “actually” going on or actually ex-
ists. in the sciences, we know from history that we 
have experienced a sequence of explanations of 
most phenomena. Each time we thought we final-
ly knew what a phenomenon really was, we found 
that the seemingly “solid” theory failed to explain 
certain new experiences. it seems the height of re-
alist hubris to believe that now we finally know the 
“true” explanation. it is certainly not rC. Hence, i 
believe that the sentence “end noted” here can also 
appropriately be written: Because these models are 
no distinctions are made between human 
beings in this theory of the development of 
understanding, there are no class and racial 
undertones.
« 18 » Further, in this paradigm it is ob-
served that human beings are motivated to 
adjust their models when their expectations 
based on the models fail to be compatible 
with their experiences in the world. This 
is the trial-and-error process mentioned 
earlier in this commentary. There is utility 
in models that fit experience and predic-
tions of future experiences. Human beings 
are driven by a need to have their models fit 
their experiences.
« 19 » schooling becomes something 
entirely different in this paradigm. instead 
of “giving” the canon to students, the goal is 
to engage them in constructing new models 
of the world or revising existing ones, i.e., 
deepening, strengthening, and expanding 
their understandings of their worlds. in a 
sense there is nothing to present, because 
understanding is constructed in and exists 
only in the mind. as such, understand-
ing cannot be presented or transmitted. 
students can only construct their under-
standings for themselves. as students are 
constructing new models for themselves in 
concert with others, they are also developing 
new reasoning patterns.
« 20 » What is a teacher to do in this 
paradigm? an appropriate goal would be 
for students to leave having developed a 
different, more powerful understanding of 
the phenomena under study than they had 
when they started. since human beings ad-
just their understandings of the world when 
existing understandings fail to fit their expe-
riences, then a teacher’s task is to engage stu-
dents in situations in which they are likely 
to notice a mismatch between their mental 
models of their world and their experienc-
es. This mismatch between one’s personal 
mental models and personal experience, 
when one perceives it, is called disequilibra-
tion. The teacher’s job then is disequilibra-
tion. This is in contrast to the paradigm one 
teacher, where the teacher’s job is to make 
the “deserving” students comfortable.
constructed in their minds, the conceptual entities 
of which the models are made do not exist outside 
of the mind.
« 21 » to accomplish this task a teacher 
needs two things, after first buying into the 
rC view. one is to have effective models of 
the students’ understandings of their worlds, 
their initial conceptions. These enable the 
teacher to imagine how students might react 
to various possible experiences that might 
be introduced into the instructional setting. 
This is what Gash is describing in §16. The 
other is an extensive knowledge of possible 
experiences that might not conform to the 
mental models or cognitive constructs of the 
students.
« 22 » Gash seems to be saying some-
thing similar:
“ a constructivist approach was not one that 
prescribed what the teachers and student teachers 
presented to the children in primary schools dur-
ing these interventions. instead, researchers asked 
questions and provided counter-examples to chal-
lenge children’s ideas about the topic.” (§15)
« 23 » to paraphrase Gash in §10: The 
emphasis in paradigm two is on the stu-
dent/experience interface instead of on the 
teacher/student interface, which is central in 
paradigm one.
conclusion
« 24 » i have pointed out that social 
interaction can be considered a type of ex-
perience that influences cognitive and psy-
chological development in a way consistent 
with rC. one pitfall of considering social 
interaction as different from experience of 
the physical world is the introduction of the 
idea of a kind of knowledge that is a phe-
nomenon of the social group, outside of 
mind. This notion of knowledge is counter 
to a basic premise of rC that knowledge ex-
ists only in the mind.
« 25 » i have also illustrated how the so-
cial injustice of convincing students they are 
not among an elite class of “deserving” stu-
dents perpetrated by paradigm-one school-
ing can be avoided by shifting to the rC-
based paradigm two. We know that social 
injustice is perpetrated against students on 
the basis of race and economic class, but not 
so obvious is the caste system of deserving 
vs. non-deserving in almost every classroom 
in the realist paradigm one.
« 26 » For all of the valuable research 
he describes, Gash has left us with a picture 
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concerning social interaction distinguished 
from experience with our physical worlds 
that is not clearly rC. We are not engaging 
our readers in constructing understanding 
of rC effectively when the language we use 
too easily implies something other than 
rC.
dewey dykstra has spent 45 years as a high school 
physics teacher, a graduate teaching assistant in 
physics, and a university physics professor. Along 
the way, he found the work of Piaget answered a 
fundamental question about teaching and learning 
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received: 12 June 2014 
accepted: 17 June 2014
author’s Response:
perspectives on Rc 
and teaching
Hugh Gash
> upshot • In response to the issues 
raised in the OPCs, I emphasize the fol-
lowing aspects: teaching cannot be 
transmitting knowledge, stages are too 
constraining a model, RC focuses on 
the individual construction and talking 
about social context invites the spectre 
of social constructivism.
« 1 » My target article “Constructing 
Constructivism” is about a narrow selec-
tion of either personal educational applica-
tions of rC experience or of constructiv-
ist research undertaken by colleagues. i 
welcome the challenges in the careful and 
thoughtful comments in these oPCs and i 
am very grateful to all the authors for their 
comments. as rC is a theory of knowledge, 
issues raised in the oPCs investigate the 
interpretation of rC epistemology and rC 
teaching, deepen ideas presented and raise 
important interpretive questions. The com-
ments are discussed in sections on teaching 
and epistemology, the place of the social, 
trivialising constructivism and psychologi-
cal issues. There are also a number of sug-
gestions for the future.
teaching and epistemology
« 2 » Education plays a central role in 
the continuity of culture and knowledge. if, 
however, we say teaching plays an impor-
tant role in the transmission of culture and 
knowledge, then the rC position is compro-
mised by the metaphor “transmission.” This 
metaphor is commonplace, and Janet Bowers 
and her colleagues (§3), arne Engström (§§2–
4), theo hug (§5) and thomas mccloughlin 
(§§5f) have each raised interpretive issues 
about teaching and its relation to rC in their 
oPCs.
« 3 » rC was introduced as a call for 
epistemological clarity in relation to Jean 
Piaget’s theory (Glasersfeld 1974). Ernst 
von Glasersfeld agreed with nell noddings’s 
characterisation of rC as a post-epistemol-
ogy (Engström §3), but it remains an epis-
temology, being concerned with the nature 
and limits of knowledge. so while an episte-
mology cannot prescribe teaching methods, 
and while epistemological educational and 
psychological issues can be examined sepa-
rately and in isolation, it is fruitful for in-
sights in associated domains to cross bound-
aries and influence relevant neighbouring 
disciplines. it is important that the identity 
of the form of information (epistemologi-
cal, educational) does not become a block to 
the possibility of exploring implications and 
relations between the domains. also, the re-
lationship we have to knowledge at any mo-
ment influences our relationship to our own 
cognitive processes and to the person(s) to 
whom we are talking. if we are startled, we 
may be caught off guard and less circum-
spect. if we are outraged, we may want to 
impose our reality. it is notoriously difficult 
to respect alternative realities when they vi-
olate our own boundaries and expectations. 
in Humberto Maturana’s (1988) terms, we 
orient to either objectivity-without-paren-
thesis or objectivity-in-parenthesis. objec-
tivity-in-parenthesis is when one recognises 
that objectivity is an illusion as there cannot 
be a match between reality and experience, 
consistent with rC, and one accepts respon-
sibility for the concepts one uses to model 
experience. objectivity-without-parenthesis 
is when one believes that knowledge is about 
matching what one knows with reality, real-
ity is separate and the goal of knowledge is 
to represent reality. We position ourselves as 
separate from reality in objectivity-without-
parenthesis or as connected in objectivity-
in-parenthesis. People are never in greater 
moral danger than when they believe they 
have the truth.
« 4 » rC teaching is where the teacher 
is sensitive to the process of construction 
in the learner with all the possibilities this 
awareness poses for considering alterna-
tive interpretations in the learner and in 
the teacher’s view of the learner. rC teach-
ing is firmly in the domain of objectivity-
in-parenthesis and valuing process. using 
rC as a model of knowing requires putting 
teachers, pupils, knowledge, teaching, learn-
ing and all other categories used describing 
education in parenthesis, together with the 
links between categories. so in writing in an 
rC context, care is needed by the writer and 
reader to come to common understandings.
« 5 » if learning is about requiring the 
child to learn what the teacher knows, about 
learning about reality, then the process the 
learner uses is irrelevant. an alternative view 
from the learner is an error. However, we 
might want to talk about the teacher’s teach-
ing as though it were divorced from learn-
ing, for example, to make some point about 
the activity of teaching. teaching remains 
a process that is interactive with learners 
and ceases when the learners have stopped 
attending. as William Glasser (1986) indi-
cated, teaching becomes very difficult when 
the learners have decided that they do not 
want to learn.
« 6 » i agree that the word “teaching” 
has connotations that what is learned is 
passed directly from the teacher to the pu-
pil (Bowers et al. §3) and so runs counter 
to the need within an rC perspective to 
sidestep this commonplace meaning. This 
is why many now prefer the phrase “teach-
ing-learning.” an alternative in the wider 
educational community is to use the word 
“teaching” and explain what this means for 
a constructivist teacher.
« 7 » dewey dykstra (§§13–16) outlined a 
traditional educational approach (paradigm 
one) that he contrasted with an rC-based 
paradigm two. i think some of the difficul-
ties with the concept of rC teaching may 
be alleviated by dykstra’s presentation of rC 
teaching in his second paradigm (§§17–23) 
and i agree with his interpretation of some of 
the probable effects of the rC-based teach-
ing model. mccloughlin (§6) also emphasises 
